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COPYRIGHT & TRADEMARK LAW 
POE v. MISSING PERSONS: 
COPYRIGHT SCRUTINY OF A "WORK OF ART" 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Poe v. Missing Persons/ the Ninth Circuit held that a 
jury could have found that plaintiff's "swimming suit" was a 
work of art entitled to copyright protection under the Federal 
Copyright Act. 2 The Ninth Circuit determined that the question 
of whether an article of clothing is strictly a utilitarian item, 
therefore not copyrightable, raised a genuine issue of material 
fact thereby precluding summary judgment.3 
Plaintiff, a designer of high fashion clothing, designed a 
"swimming suit" which he described as a work of art.· Plaintiff 
sought damages when a photograph of one of the defendants 
wearing the design appeared on the cover of a record album 
which had received national distribution. Plaintiff contended 
that this unauthorized copying of his design constituted copy-
right infringement.6 
1. 745 F.2d 1238 (9th Cir. 1984) (per Alarcon, J.; the other panel members were 
Wallace, J. and Pregerson, H.) 
2. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976). Plaintiff's creation, "Aquatint No.5," was 
an article of clothing resembling a woman's two-piece swimming suit. 745 F.2d at 1239. 
3. ld. at 1243. 
4. Plaintiff contended that his creation was "an artwork in the medium of soft 
sculpture entitled Aquatint No.5." ld. at 1239. 
5. As a student at the California Institute of the Arts in 1978, plaintiff designed 
"Aquatint No.5." Plaintiff entered the design in an art show sponsored by the Los Ange-
les Institute for Contemporary Art shortly after he created it. At the art show plaintiff 
permitted a photographer friend to photograph Dale Bozzio, as member of the rock 
group "Missing Persons," for his friend's professional portfolio. The photograph was re-
produced on the cover of the album titled "Missing Persons." Although plaintiff gave his 
permission for the photograph to be taken, he did not consent to the photograph's place-
ment on the defendant's album cover. ld. at 1240. 
229 
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Plaintiff sued for copyright infringement and for violation 
of section 43 (a) of the Lanham Trademark Act.s The district 
court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment on 
both claims,7 concluding that the design was not copyrightable 
because the functional aspects of the work were not indepen-
dently separable from the artistic aspects of the work.8 Plaintiff 
then appealed to the Ninth Circuit.9 
II. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
The Ninth Circuit held that summary judgment was correct 
only if no genuine factual issue existed on the question of 
whether the artistic features of the work could be identified sep-
arately from and exist independently of the useful features of 
the work.1o 
The Ninth Circuit court reviewed the summary judgment de 
novo on the issue of whether the creation was a "useful arti-
cle."ll On appeal, plaintiff contended that the evidence raised an 
issue of material fact as to whether the design was a soft sculp-
ture or a useful article.12 Defendants offered evidence that the 
design was worn by a woman for the photograph, thus proving 
the utilitarian nature of plaintiffs design. The Ninth Circuit 
6. Lanham Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982). 
7. Plaintiff had filed a declaration on appeal in opposition to the summary judgment 
to give factual support to his argument that "Aquatint No.5" was a work of art. He 
described the design: "It is an artist's impression or rendering of an article of clothing 
and in this context I developed, created and originated this work as an artist. It stands 
by itself as a work of conceptual art." Id. at 1240. 
8. A description of the design lends credence to any reference to the "swimming 
suit" as a work of art. The suit is a two piece design. The top part of it consists of two 
pieces of clear plastic cut in a figure eight shape. Within each loop of the figure eight is a 
triangular piece of clear plastic filled with crushed rock in bright colors. The other sec-
tion consists of two pieces of clear plastic which were cut into octogonal shapes and 
connected together by plastic. Within each octogon, there is a sealed area which also 
contains crushed rock in the same colors as are in the top half. Id. at 1241. 
9. Id. at 1240. 
10. The Act defines "useful article" and then describes how the article may be con-
sidered a work of art: "the design of a useful article, as defined in this section, shall be 
considered a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if. . .such design incorporates 
pictorial, graphic or sculptural features than can be identified separately from, and are 
capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of this article." Copyright 
Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976). 
11. A "useful article" under the Act is an "article having an intrinsic utilitarian 
function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey informa-
tion." Id. 
12. 745 F.2d at 1240. 
2
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 1 [1985], Art. 12
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol15/iss1/12
1985] COPYRIGHT & TRADEMARK 231 
criticized the district court's holding based on this evidence 
since the evidence clearly demonstrated that plaintiff intended 
to create a work of art which portrayed a swimming suit. I3 The 
court noted that portrayal of the appearance of an article of 
clothing is not enough to disallow copyright protection. 14 
After a visual examination of the design, however, the Ninth 
Circuit could not determine whether one could walk, let alone 
swim, while wearing plaintiff's creation. Since the Ninth Circuit 
assumed that the district court's determination was based on 
visual examination of the article, and since some evidence Iii was 
in the record showing that the article was a work of art and not 
a functional item, the court reasoned that an issue of fact ex-
isted which should have been determined by the jury.I6 
Defendants relied on Fabrica Inc. v. El Dorado Corp.,!' and 
argued that the question of whether an item is a "useful article" 
or a "work of art" under the Copyright Act is a question of law 
and not of fact.I8 However, the court distinguished Fabrica by 
pointing out that Fabrica did not support defendants' argument 
and that in Poe, the evidence showed that the only reason for 
the existence of the plaintiff's creation was as a work of art for 
display.I9 
13. The court noted that the issue of whether the article was in fact "visual art" or a 
"useful article" of clothing had to be determined by examining the evidence offered 
before the district court. After visually examining plaintiff's creation, the Ninth Circuit 
concluded that they could not determine as a matter of law whether the article could be 
worn as an article of clothing for swimming or any other functional purpose. Id. at 1242. 
14.Id. 
15. The plaintiff had testified that "Aquatint No.5" had been entered at the Los 
Angeles Institute of Contemporary Art show as a "three-dimensional work of art in pri-
marily flexible clear vinyl covered rock media." Id. at 1240. 
16. The record showed that at best, the district court judge believed that the design 
looked like a swimming suit. Id. at 1242. 
17. 697 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1983). 
18. This is not what is expressed in Fabrica. On the page cited by defendants, the 
opinion quotes the section of the Act which describes the type of pictorial, graphic, and 
sculptural works for which copyright protection is given: "two dimensional and three 
dimensional works of fine, graphic and applied art, photographs, prints and art repro-
ductions, maps, globes, charts, technical drawings, diagrams and models." Copyright Act 
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976). The opinion does not hold that the usefulness of an article is a 
question of law. 745 F.2d at 1242. 
19. In Fabrica, the Ninth Circuit held that the disputed item had no artistic feature 
which was separately identifiable from the useful function of the article. The item was a 
carpet sample display folder. Defendants in Fabrica did not contend that the folder was 
not useful; they alleged that the design of the folder was separately identifiable as a work 
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The defendants also argued that Gay Toys, Inc. v. Buddy L. 
Corp.20 supported their argument that the issue of usefulness is 
a question of law, however, the Ninth Circuit stated that the 
case was not applicable to these facts. 21 In Gay Toys, the issue 
was whether toys are copyrightable, not whether the article was, 
in fact, a toy. In Poe, the issue was whether a genuine issue of 
fact existed with respect to whether plaintiff designed a work of 
art, or a strictly utilitarian article. 22 
The court concluded that the question of whether any func-
tional aspects of plaintiff's creation can be separated from the 
artistic aspects is a question of fact which must be presented to 
the jury.23 Evidence which may be offered to make this determi-
nation includes expert opinion,u evidence of the creator's inten-
tions, and testimony concerning the customs of using such ob-
jects in the art or commercial trade world. The court also noted 
that the district court could also consider evidence of the crea-
tion's marketability in the art world.25 
III. CONCLUSION 
Although the Ninth Circuit properly construed Section 101 
of the Copyright Act in determining whether an issue of fact ex-
isted in Poe, the court left an important question open on what 
standard should be applied to determine whether a specific crea-
tion is a work of art or a strictly utilitarian article. There is a 
potential problem in holding that an article of clothing created 
as a work of art is not a "useful article" under the Copyright 
of art from its function as a folder. The court determined that since the only reason for 
the folder's existence was its usefulness in marketing carpet samples, the design was not 
separately identifiable. 697 F.2d at.892·93. 
20. 703 F.2d 970 (6th Cir. 1983). 
21. In Gay Toys, the issue before the court was the copyrightability of a toy air-
plane. The district court had held that a toy airplane is a useful article which was not 
copyrightable. The Sixth Circuit held that a toy airplane has no intrinsic utilitarian 
function and therefore is not a "useful article" within the meaning of the statute. 703 
F.2d at 970. 
22. 745 F.2d at 1242. 
23. [d. at 1243. 
24. In a footnote, the court mentioned that the plaintiff himself may qualify as an 
expert in light of his academic training and his experience as an artist and fashion de-
signer. Although plaintiff is clearly an interested party, and his expert testimony would 
undoubtedly be suspect, the court was willing to allow him to testify on his own behalf as 
an expert. [d. n.2. 
25. [d. 
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Act; namely, the extent to which such an article of clothing may 
be useful before it loses its copyright protection as a work of art. 
The holding in Poe indicates that there will be more litigation 
on this issue. 
David Greenwald* 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1986. 
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LITCHFIELD v. SPIELBERG: 
THE SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY TEST 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Litchfield v. Spielberg, 1 the Ninth Circuit held that sum-
mary judgment is proper in a copyright infringement action 
where no reasonable jury could find there was substantial simi-
larity between the allegedly infringed and allegedly infringing 
work.2 The court also dismissed causes of action for unfair com-
petition and misrepresentation because state law is preempted 
by the Copyright Act of 1976 in copyright infringement actions.3 
Plaintiff, author of the musical play Lokey from Maldemar, 
alleged that the producers of the motion picture E. T.-The Ex-
tra- Terrestrial had infringed her copyright. Plaintiff sued under 
the Federal Copyright Act and under the Lanham Trademark 
Act4 for "reverse passing off." The district court granted defen-
dant's motion for summary judgment on the copyright infringe-
ment and Lanham Act claims, and dismissed the state claims. 
Plaintiff then appealed to the Ninth Circuit. I! 
1. 736 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1984) (per Wright, E.A.; the other panel members were 
Ferguson, J. and Reinhardt, J.). 
2. Id. at 1356. 
3. Title 17, the Copyright Act of 1976, preempted the entire field of copyright. 
There is no longer a common law right of copyright. Thus, the authority for any sate 
claims which previously might have been attached to a copyright infringement cause of 
action are now governed by Title 17. Section 301 of the Act provides: 
(a) On and after January 1, 1978 all legal or equitable rights 
that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the 
general scope of copyright as specified by sections 102 and 
103, whether published or unpublished are governed exclu-
sively by this title. Thereafter, no person is entitled to any 
such right or equivalent right in any such work under the 
common law or status of any state. 
Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1976). 
4. Lanham Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 43(a) (1975). 
5. The play Lokey from Maldemar had been written and publicly performed in 
1978. Plaintiff had submitted the play to defendants for consideration as a screenplay 
twice; once in its original form and once as a screenplay. Defendants rejected both ef-
forts. In 1982 defendant's movie E. T.-The Extraterrestrial was released to commercial 
234 
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II. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
A. Summary Judgment 
The Ninth Circuit held that summary judgment is correct 
only if no reasonable jury could find that the works in issue are 
substantially similar.s In Litchfield, access to the copyrighted 
work and the validity of plaintiff's copyright were not in 
dispute.7 
The court, citing Twentieth Century-Fox Corp. v. MCA, 
Inc.,s stated that summary judgment may be appropriate in cop-
yright infringement actions. The court noted, however, that the 
standard for granting summary judgment is difficult to meet.9 
theaters. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff brought suit. Although the Ninth Circuit never 
referred to plaintiff's suit as frivolous, their treatment of the facts, in light of the protec-
tion afforded a copyright owner under the Act, indicates plaintiff's action was meritless. 
Id. 
6. The substantial similarity test is one part of a three part test for copyright in-
fringement. To prevail in a copyright infringement action, plaintiff must show ownership 
of the copyright, access to the copyrighted work, and substantial similarity between the 
allegedly infringed and allegedly infringing works. The court cited See v. Durang, 711 
F.2d 141, 143 (9th Cir. 1983) in which the court noted that their review of summary 
judgment was de novo. Thus, the court made detailed comparisons of the two works for a 
determination of substantial similarity. Id. at 1356. 
7. In Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corporation v. MCA, 715 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 
1983) the primary issue for trial was also substantial similarity. Plaintiffs were the pro-
ducers of the motion picture Star Wars. They alleged that their rights were infringed by 
the defendant's production of the television series Battlestar Galactica. Id. at 1328. 
B. Unlike Litchfield, the court in Twentieth Century-Fox held that summary judg-
ment was not properly granted in the district court. A party will not prevail on summary 
judgment in a copyright infringement action unless no genuine issues of material fact 
exist with respect to questions of substantial similarity of idea and the expression of the 
idea. Id. at 1329. 
An idea alone is not protected by the Act. Rather, it is the expression of the idea 
which is protected. Section 102 provides: "(b) In no case does copyright protection for an 
original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of 
operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, 
explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work." Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) 
(1976). The court concluded that the questions of fact with respect to similarity were too 
close to be dismissed summarily. However, the court expressly stated that they had no 
opinion as to whether any similarity existed. Id. 
9. The court set the standard for summary judgment: "A grant of summary judg-
ment for plaintiff is proper where works are so overwhelmingly identical that the possi-
bility of independent creation is precluded ... Similarly, summary judgment for defen-
dant is appropriate where works are so dissimilar that a claim of infringement is without 
merit." 715 F.2d at 1330 (citing Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Dan River Mills, Inc., 295 F. 
Supp. 1366, 1369 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) and Rose v. Connely, 38 F. Supp. 54, 55 (S.D.N.Y. 
1941)). 
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The court reviewed the summary judgment de novo on the 
issue of substantial similarity and made independent compari-
sons of the two works. lo The court applied an extrinsic test to 
determine similarity of ideas, and an intrinsic test to compare 
similarity in expression of the ideas. 11 
The court noted that although both works involved the ad-
ventures of aliens stranded on earth, they were not substantially 
similar.l2 The court stated that although there were some simi-
larities in the opening scenes of Lokey and E. T., the sequence of 
events, mood, dialogue, and the characters depicted in the two 
works was not substantially similar. Since ideas, by themselves, 
are not protected by the Copyright Act, the court found that 
similarities in the plot were mere generalities for which copy-
10. The court reviewed the script for the play Lokey, and the author's subsequent 
screen adaptation of the play which they compared with the "continuity" script (a con· 
densed form of the script) of E. T .. The court implied that a reading of a continuity 
script will not always be sufficient to allow a comparison of a motion picture with other 
works, but in this case the comparison was permissible since neither party claimed that 
the continuity script varied from the film. [d. (citing Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 
F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1939) and Jason v. Fonda, 698 F.2d 966 (9th Cir. 1982». 
11. The extrinsic test involves comparisons of ideas embodied in the plot, theme, 
dialogue, mood, setting, pace and sequence. The intrinsic test involves comparisons of 
the total concept and feel of works. This test depends on the response of the reasonable 
person to the works. Where total concept and feel of the two works are completely differ-
ent, and the court can determine this as a matter of law, the grant of summary judgment 
to the defendant is proper. 
In Jason v. Fonda, 698 F.2d 966 (9th Cir. 1983), the Ninth Circuit offered a grant of 
summary judgment to defendants in plaintiff's copyright infringement action. Plaintiff 
alleged that her book Concomitant Soldier was infringed by defendant Jane Fonda's 
motion picture Coming Home. Summary judgment was granted on two grounds. Plaintiff 
had failed to show that defendant had access to her work. Additionally, the court deter-
mined that, as a matter of law, there was no substantial similarity between the two 
works. In finding that no genuine issues of fact existed, the court read both the book and 
the continuity script from the movie, and found that there was no substantial similarity. 
The court noted that any similarity was too general to be protected by the copyright Act. 
[d. at 967. 
12. Lokey was a musical, E. T. was not. Even more significant was the difference 
between the treatment of the characters and plot in Lokey and E. T. In Lokey, two aliens 
landed at the North Pole, traveled to a beach in Japan, and then to the Andes Moun-
tains. The Ninth Circuit found that the plot in E. T. was clearly different. All the action 
in E. T. took place in and around a suburban California home where E. T. developed a 
psycho-physical empathy with a 10 year old boy. The dramatic ending in E. T. marked 
the final key difference between the two works. As time passed, E. T. deteriorated and 
was eventually captured by scientists. At the end of the film, just as it appeared that 
E. T. would die in captivity, he suddenly came to life and was rescued by fellow aliens 
from his home planet. A chase ensued and the film ended with E. T. returning home. 736 
F.2d at 1355. 
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right protection is not granted. 13 Therefore, the court concluded 
that no reasonable person could view E. T. as a dramatization of 
Lokey and granted defendant's motion for summary judgment.14 
The court also ruled on a claim plaintiff failed to raise at 
trial. The court ruled on plaintiff's claim that defendants pre-
pared a derivative work based on Lokey which violated the Cop-
yright Act. 111 The court granted· summary judgment because 
there cannot be a derivative work without a showing of substan-
tial similarity.16 Since the court found no substantial similarity, 
in either idea or expression, between the two works, it concluded 
that E. T. could not be a derivative work. 
B. "Reverse Passing Off" 
The Ninth Circuit also dismissed plaintiff's claim for "re-
verse passing off,"17 noting that to successfully allege a violation 
13. [d. at 1357. 
14. [d. 
15. The Copyright Act provides that the owner of the copyright has the exclusive 
right to propose derivative works based on the copyrighted work. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 
(1976). 
16. In order to qualify as a derivative work under the Act, the work must incorpo-
rate, in some form, a portion of the copyrighted work. One of the exclusive rights of 
copyright is the right to create a derivative work. A derivative work is one which is based 
on the copyrighted work. Thus, an infringing work must incorporate a portion of the 
copyrighted work in some form. Examples of derivative works include a motion picture 
version of a book or play. However, a detailed commentary on a work or a musical com-
position inspired by a novel would not normally constitute infringement. 17 U.S.C. § 106. 
17. "Reverse passing off" is a cause of action the Ninth Circuit allows under the 
Lanham Trademark Act where a party attempts to pass another party's product off to 
the public under another name by substituting a name for the owner's name. The Lan-
ham Act provides for liability whenever a party uses "false designations of origin and 
false descriptions or representations in the advertising and sale of goods and services." 
See Lanham Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 43(a). 
The court in Litchfield relied on their decision in Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602 
(9th Cir. 1981), in which they interpreted the Lanham Act very broadly. The Ninth Cir-
cuit held that the Act extends protection to motion pictures. Further, in Smith the court 
noted that the Second Circuit allowed a cause of action under the Lanham Act for "re-
verse passing off" in any instance where the defendant obtains plaintiff's product, 
removes the plaintiff's name and replaces it with a name of his choice. [d. at 607. 
In Smith, a film distributor removed an actor's name from the film credits and ad-
vertising material and substituted a different name; this amounted to "reverse passing 
off". There is a distinction between what is called "reverse passing off" and "passing 
off". When the latter occurs, someone has sold a good or service of his creation under 
someone else's name. "Reverse passing off" refers to the situation where the good or 
service is someone else's and the infringer has removed the trademark or name before 
reselling the good or service under a different name. In Smith, the plaintiff contracted to 
star in an Italian movie. He was to receive star billing in the screen credits and advertis-
9
Greenwald and Gaspich: Summaries: Copyright & Trademark Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1985
238 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:234 
under the Lanham Act plaintiff must show that her play was 
being "passed off" on the public as the defendant's work. The 
initial step in showing this requires a finding that the two works 
are substantially similar. Absent a finding of substantial similar-
ity, the Lanham Act is inapplicable. Since no substantial simi-
larity was found in either idea or expression between the works, 
the court determined that there could be no Lanham Act 
violation. 18 
C. The Preemption Doctrine 
Finally, plaintiff's state claims were dismissed on the 
grounds that they were preempted by federal copyright law.19 In 
applying the preemption doctrine, the Ninth Circuit noted that 
the Copyright Act states that if a work fits within the general 
subject matter of copyright, the state protection, either by stat-
ute or common law, is inapplicable and the cause of action is 
preempted.20 Similarly, the Act provides that no state copyright 
protection is available for works once they have been "fixed" in 
any tangible medium of expression.21 
III. CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit seems to believe that many copyright 
suits are misguided22 due to a lack of knowledge and under-
standing with respect to the scope of copyright protection.2S 
Copyright protection is not given to ideas unless the court finds 
that both the ideas and the expression of the ideas are substan-
tially similar. 
ing of the film. Defendant removed plaintiff's name and substituted the name of another 
actor. Plaintiff brought suit in federal court alleging violation of section 43 of the Lan-
ham Act. [d. at 605. 
18. If no federal claim can be brought, the Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction to 
hear any pendant state claims. For this reason the Ninth Circuit dismissed plaintiff's 
state claims outside the scope of claims preempted by the Copyright Act. 736 F.2d at 
1358. 
19. The Copyright Act preempts common law copyright claims arising from works 
commenced before January 1, 1978. If a work is not "fixed" in a tangible medium of 
expression, there is still common law protection of the copyright and the federal statu-
tory copyright has not been initiated. The state rights which are preempted by the stat-
ute include only rights that are equivalent to the exclusive rights of copyright as speci-
fied in the Act. 17 U.S.C. § 301. 
20. 736 F.2d at 1358. 
21. 17 U.S.C. § 301. 
22. 736 F.2d at 1358. 
23. [d. 
10
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Application of the "extrinsic" and "intrinsic" tests for sub-
stantial similarity clearly demonstrates that there was insuffi-
cient similarity between the works in Litchfield to give rise to a 
cause of action.24 Arguably, the Ninth Circuit's "extrinsic" and 
"intrinsic" tests are proper in copyright infringement cases.211 In 
any event, the tests were correctly applied in Litchfield. 
David Greenwald* 
24. [d. 
25. The Ninth Circuit has adopted its own version of the "extrinsic" and "intrinsic" 
tests from the Second Circuit copyright infringement cases. See Sid and Marty Kroft 
Television Production, Inc. v. McDonalds Corporation, 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 
1977). 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1986. 
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ESTABLISHING THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF 
TRADEMARK ABANDONMENT 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In California Cedar Products u. Pine Mountain Corpora-
tion,l the Ninth Circuit held that the trial court2 properly deter-
mined when abandonment and subsequent appropriation of a 
trademark becomes effective, and accordingly, affirmed the grant 
of a preliminary injunction against trademark infringement.3 
Upon formal abandonment' of the "Duraflame" trademark 
by the Kingsford Company, California Cedar immediately 
claimed that it appropriated the trademark by making the first 
subsequent commercial use.1! However, competitors also asserted 
1. 724 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1984) (per Tang, J.; the other panel members were Rein-
hardt, J. and Swygert, United States Circuit Judge for the Seven Circuit, sitting by 
designation). 
2. A. Andrew Hauk, Senior District Judge; United States District Court for the Cen-
tral District of California. 
3. 724 F.2d at 827. 
4. [d. at 829. The effective date of formal abandonment of the "Duraflame" trade-
mark was the primary issue in dispute. In a company report of March 31. 1982. Kings-
ford disclosed its intention to withdraw from the artificial fire log market at an appropri-
ate future date. Despite negotiation with several corporations, including the parties to 
this action to transfer the right to the trademark, Kingsford decided to write off the 
valuable goodwill associated with the trademark as a tax deduction. [d. Formal abandon-
ment of a trademark can often provide a greater financial benefit than an outright sale. 
See Manhattan Industries, Inc. v. Sweater Bee by Banff, Ltd., 627 F.2d 628, 629 (2nd. 
Cir. 1980). 
On April 21, 1982, Kingsford formally decided to withdraw from the market, and 
authorized Mr. Bolingbroke, its vice-president, to decide the actual date of abandon-
ment. Negotiations to transfer the trademark rights continued, and on June 8, 1982 
Kingsford granted California Cedar a right of first refusal to consider the purchase of the 
"Duraflame" trademark. 
On June 28, 1982, Kingsford announced in the Wall Street Journal that the formal 
abandonment of the "Duraflame" trademark was effective that day. Also on June 28, 
attorneys for Kingsford filed documents with the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office to formally abandon the trademark that day. 724 F.2d at 829. 
5. [d. The first to make a bona fide commercial use of an abandoned trademark 
ordinarily acquires exclusive rights in that trademark. See Manhattan Industries, Inc. v. 
Sweater Bee by Banff, Ltd., 627 F.2d at 630; Sutton Cosmetics (P.R.) v. Lander Co., 455 
F.2d 285, 288 (2nd Cir. 1972). 
On June 28, 1982, the effective date of abandonment, California Cedar began selling 
240 
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priority by first commercial use8 of the valuable7 trademark, and 
California Cedar sought a preliminary injunction8 to restrain 
Pine Mountain and Consumer Chemical Corporation from using 
the "Duraflame" trademark and trade dress.9 The district court 
granted a preliminary injunction10 and Pine Mountain and Con-
sumer Chemical appealed. ll 
II. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
The Ninth Circuit initially noted that to obtain a prelimi-
nary injunction, the petitioner must show either the probability 
of success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury 
without an injunction, or that the balance of hardships strongly 
favors the petitioner. 12 The court also stated that upon appellate 
review, a preliminary injunction should be reversed only upon a 
showing of a clear error of law or an abuse of discretion by the 
district court. 13 
fire logs in California and in interstate commerce, using the "Duraflame" trademark and 
trade dress, identifying itself as the source of manufacture. On August 10, 1982, Califor-
nia Cedar sold "Duraflame" logs in Canada, and on October 7, 1982 California Cedar 
made its first post-abandonment sale in Europe. 724 F.2d at 829. 
6. [d. On June 26, 1982, Mr. Bolingbroke contacted Pine Mountain and disclosed 
that Kingsford intended to formally abandon the "Duraflame" trademark on June 28. 
He was unable to contact California Cedar until June 28. In an attempt to gain priority 
by first commercial use, immediately after the June 26 phone call Pine Mountain expe-
dited a shipment of artificial logs to Utah. The logs were packaged in a Duraflame wrap-
per that had been altered to indicate Pine Mountain as the source of manufacture. On 
June 30, 1982, Consumer Chemical also packaged its logs in Duraflame wrappers, indi-
cating Polysolve Corporation, an affiliate, as the manufacturer, and shipped them from 
Canada to New York. 
7. [d. The "Duraflame" trademark identified a successful manufacturer whose well-
known product commanded a dominant 50% share of the American artificial fire log 
market by 1975. "Duraflame" logs were also sold in Europe and Canada. 
8. [d. California Cedar brought an action for a preliminary injunction under § 43 (a) 
of the Lanham Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1982). 
9. 724 F.2d at 829. 
10. [d. at 829-30: The district court found that California Cedar made the first com-
mercial use of the "Duraflame" trademark in the United States and in Europe after 
formal abandonment by Kingsford. However, the court found that Consumer Chemical 
made the first use of the abandoned trademark in Canada. 
The district court consolidate the two cases, and issued a preliminary injunction 
that enjoined: (1) Pine Mountain from using the "Duraflame" trademark and trade dress 
in the United States, Canada, and Europe; (2) Consumer Chemical from using the trade-
mark and trade dress in Europe and the United States; and (3) California Cedar from 
using the trademark and trade dress in Canada. [d. at 830. 
11. [d. 
12. [d. (citing Beltran v. Meyers, 677 F.2d 1317, 1320 (9th Cir. 1982». 
13. [d. at 828. 
13
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The appellants challenge to the injunction focused upon the 
trial court's determination that California Cedar was likely to 
prevail on the merits of its trademark infringement action.14 Al-
though the parties agreed that the first to use an abandoned 
trademark in a commercially meaningful way was entitled to ex-
clusive rights in the trademark, the appellants claimed that an 
erroneous legal standard was used to determine the effective 
date of abandonment.1& 
The Ninth Circuit rejected the appellants' contention, and 
concurred with the district court finding that June 28, 1982 was 
the effective date of actual abandonment of the trademark. IS 
The court noted that the finding of the effective abandonment 
date was properly based upon the totality of the circumstances, 
rather than solely upon the express intent of Kingsford. I7 The 
panel stated that Kingsford explicitly declared its intention to 
actually abandon the mark on June 28, 1982.18 Additionally, the 
court observed that Kingsford conclusively demonstrated its in-
tent to actually abandon the trademark on June 28, 1982 by its 
notice of formal abandonment that was nationally publishedl9 
and filed that same day with the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office.20 
The Ninth Circuit also rejected Pine Mountain's claim that 
even if June 28, 1982 was the actual date of abandonment, it 
established priority over California Cedar by making the first 
14. 724 F.2d at 830. The court stated that upon review of the likelihood of success 
on the merits, they consider whether the district court abused its discretion, relied upon 
erroneous legal standards, or relied upon clearly erroneous findings of fact. [d. See Miss 
Universe, Inc. v. Flesher, 605 F.2d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir. 1979). 
15. 724 F.2d at 830. The appellants argued that although Kingsford intended the 
abandonment of the trademark to become effective on June 28, the dispositive date of 
actual abandonment occurred much earlier. Pine Mountain claimed that abandonment 
occurred on June 26 when Mr. Bolingbroke informed them of Kingsford's intent to aban-
don the trademark. Consumer Chemical contended that abandonment was effective on 
March 31, 1982 when Kingsford wrote off the goodwill of "Duraflame" as a tax 
deduction. 
16. 724 F.2d at 830. 
17. [d. 
18. [d. at 828. 
19. [d. at 829. The Kingsford Company published a formal announcement in the 
Wall Street Journal on June 28, 1982 to declare that the abandonment of the 
"Duraflame" trademark was effective that day. 
20. [d. 
14
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subsequent commercial use.21 The court chastised Pine Moun-
tain and declared that the purported commercial use of the 
trademark by a June 26, 1982 sale was made prematurely and in 
bad faith, and thus could not usurp California Cedar's priority.2l! 
Concluding its review of the preliminary injunction, the 
court stated that since California Cedar acquired exclusive 
rights to the "Duraflame" trademark and trade dress, it was evi-
dent that use of the mark by the appellants would possibly 
cause irreparable injury.23 The panel also noted that because 
California Cedar had always been the primary manufacturer of 
"Duraflame" 10gs,24 and owned a large inventory of the logs,21! 
the balance of hardships also strongly supported the grant of the 
preliminary injunction.26 
III. CRITIQUE 
California Cedar Products provided the Ninth Circuit with 
an opportunity to clarify the standard used to determine the 
often complicated issues of when abandonment of a trademark 
becomes effective. The totality of the circumstances test 
presents a practicable approach that enables the lower courts to 
consider all relevant factors that may indicate abandonment.27 
21. [d. at 830. 
22. [d. See supra note 6. The court stated that Pine Mountain's claim of first com-
mercial use of the trademark subsequent to abandonment conflicted with the district 
court's finding that appellant did not use the mark in commerce until June 29, 1982. 
Upon the clearly erroneous standard of review, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the district 
court's findings were not clearly erroneous. 724 F.2d at 830. 
23. [d. at 831. 
24. [d. The court disclosed a chronology of the ownership of the "Duraflame" trade-
mark and the production of the logs that begins and ends with California Cedar. In 1969, 
California Cedar began to manufacture and market artifical fire logs. In 1970, California 
Cedar Firelog Company, Inc., a separate corporate entity, changed its name to Duraflame 
Inc. (Old Duraflame), and owned the exclusive rights to the "Duraflame" trademark. 
Several years later, California Cedar began to manufacture logs on the East coast at a 
new facility (New Duraflame Inc.). In 1978, the Kingsford Company purchased all the 
stock of Old Duraflame Inc., and also acquired the "Duraflame" trademark and the land 
owned by New Duraflame, Inc. California Cedar leased its production equipment to 
Kingsford, but continued to manufacture the logs for Kingsford by agreement. Old 
Duraflame Inc. was eventually merged into the Kingsford Company. [d. at 828-29. 
25. [d. at 829. California Cedar agreed to purchase over $3 million dollars worth of 
Kingsford's inventory of "Duraflame" logs on June 8, 1982. 
26. [d. at 831. The court also noted that, unlike Pine Mountain and Consumer 
Chemical, California Cedar only sold logs under the "Duraflame" trademark. 
27. [d. at 830. See supra text accompanying notes 17-20. The court also noted that 
Kingsford continued to negotiate a possible sale of the "Duraflame" trademark rights 
15
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This standard also facilitates the crucial finding of priority of 
commercial use between closely conflicting claims of subsequent 
appropriation of an abandoned trademark. 
Although the court stated that an abandoned trademark 
may be appropriated by establishing the first subsequent use of 
the mark in a "commercially meaningful way,"28 the panel ne-
glected to clarify the requisite measure of use. It is uncertain 
from this vague standard whether the requirement refers to the 
type or the quantity of commercial use that must be established 
to appropriate the trademark.29 This ambiguity will likely cause 
additional confusion, and may encourage litigation to determine 
whether an appropriated trademark was actually used in a 
"commercially meaningful way." 
Despite a sound analysis of the preliminary injunction, the 
court only briefly noted several significant factors that may have 
been the overriding reasons favoring California Cedar's claim of 
priority. It may be reasonably concluded that the court was sub-
stantially influenced by California Cedar's prior ownership of 
the "Duraflame" trademark, and its continuous production of 
the logs since 1969.30 Conversely, the court may have been re-
pelled by Pine Mountain's attempt to establish the first com-
mercial use of the trademark through a sales transaction con-
ducted prior to the effective date of abandonment.31 
IV. CONCLUSION 
With the increasing frequency of corporate mergers and in-
solvencies, and the attendant abandonment of trademarks for 
favorable tax benefits, California Cedar Products provides 
timely clarification of the effective date of trademark abandon-
ment. With a clear date of effective abandonment that tolls the 
priority contest of appropriation, California Cedar Products may 
until formal abandonment was announced on June 28. 724 F.2d at 830. 
28. [d. 
29. With the exception of sale and shipment dates, the court did not disclose any 
facts concerning the purported use of the trademark in a "commercially meaningful 
way" by the parties. 
30. [d. at 828-29. See supra note 24. 
31. [d. at 830. The court described Pine Mountain's June 26 sale as "premature and 
in bad faith." [d. See supra note 6. 
16
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eliminate misguided attempts to surreptitiously gain priority 
over corporate competitors. 
James Gaspich* 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1985. 
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